A cognitive view of relevant implication

Relevant logics provide an alternative to classical implication that is capable of accounting for the relationship between the antecedent and the consequence of a valid implication. Relevant implication is usually explained in terms of information required to assess a proposition. By doing so, relevant implication introduces a number of cognitively relevant aspects in the denition of logical operators. In this paper, we aim to take a closer look at the cognitive feature of relevant implication. For this purpose, we develop a cognitively-oriented interpretation of the semantics of relevant logics. In particular, we provide an interpretation of Routley-Meyer semantics in terms of conceptual spaces and we show that it meets the constraints of the algebraic semantics of relevant logic

Understanding Predication in Conceptual Spaces

We argue that a cognitive semantics has to take into account the possibly partial information that a cognitive agent has of the world. After discussing Gärdenfors's view of objects in conceptual spaces, we offer a number of viable treatments of partiality of information and we formalize them by means of alternative predicative logics. Our analysis shows that understanding the nature of simple predicative sentences is crucial for a cognitive semantics

Representing Concepts by Weighted Formulas

A concept is traditionally defined via the necessary and sufficient conditions that clearly determine its extension. By contrast, cognitive views of concepts intend to account for empirical data that show that categorisation under a concept presents typicality effects and a certain degree of indeterminacy. We propose a formal language to compactly represent concepts by leveraging on weighted logical formulas. In this way, we can model the possible synergies among the qualities that are relevant for categorising an object under a concept. We show that our proposal can account for a number of views of concepts such as the prototype theory and the exemplar theory. Moreover, we show how the proposed model can overcome some limitations of cognitive views

Organisations and Variable Embodiments

How can organisations survive not only the substitution of members, but also other dramatic changes, like that of the norms regulating their activities, the goals they plan to achieve, or the system of roles that compose them? This paper is as first step towards a well-founded ontological analysis of the persistence of organisations through changes. Our analysis leverages Kit Fine’s notions of rigid and variable embodiment and proposes to view the (history of the) decisions made by the members of the organisation as the criterion to re-identify the organisation through change

Old and New Riddles on Concept Sharing

We ask whether social interaction demands sharing social concepts. We illustrate our point by depicting possible situations that emerge when two individuals play chess. We formalize our hypothesis in First Order Logic and we show that the very idea of sharing social concepts poses an interesting challenge both from the standpoint of knowledge representation and of philosophical conceptual analysis. By endorsing a minimal notion of interaction, we conclude that sharing social concepts is not necessary for social interaction. Then, we relate our view to Wittgenstein\u27s and Kripke\u27s "Rule-following Considerations

The Mysterious Appearance of Objects

Moving from some reflections on the empirical practice of measurement and on the nature of visual perception, we present a constructivist approach to objects. At the basis of such approach there is the idea that all we may know about what is out there is always mediated by some sort of apparatus, being it a measurement instrument or our perceptual system. Given this perspective, some questions are in order: how are objects identified and re-identified through time from the outcomes of apparatuses? How can we distinguish different (kinds of) objects? Our first goal will be to make explicit the mechanism used to build objects from the apparatuses\u27 outcomes, emphasizing what are the ontological and representational problems this construction faces. A second contribution will be a preliminary discussion of some possible ways to distinguish social objects, the constructed objects par excellence, from physical ones. A third contribution will be an attempt to make a bridge between two scientific communities that rarely seek contact or mutual recognition: that of formal ontologies and that of formal concept analysis

Events and Activities: Is there an Ontology behind BPMN?

In the context of business process modelling, the Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) is a de-facto standard with more than 70 commercial tools that currently support its use. Amongst its main modelling constructs, BPMN includes activities and events. However, the focus of the standard is on providing an intuitive graphical language, rather than formal semantics specifications. This results in semantic ambiguities regarding the interpretation of its modelling constructs. We investigate whether the main building blocks of BPMN commit to an ontological theory of the domain entities at hand, eventually clarifying this commitment by the approach of ontological analysis

A Toothful of Concepts: Towards a Theory of Weighted Concept Combination

We introduce a family of operators to combine Description Logic concepts. They aim to characterise complex concepts that apply to instances that satisfy \enough" of the concept descriptions given. For instance, an individual might not have any tusks, but still be considered an elephant. To formalise the meaning of "enough", the operators take a list of weighted concepts as arguments, and a certain threshold to be met. We commence a study of the formal properties of these operators, and study some variations. The intended applications concern the representation of cognitive aspects of classication tasks: the interdependencies among the attributes that dene a concept, the prototype of a concept, and the typicality of the instances

The interplay between models and observations

We propose a formal framework to examine the relationship between models and observations. To make our analysis precise, models are reduced to first-order theories that represent both terminological knowledge-e.g., the laws that are supposed to regulate the domain under analysis and that allow for explanations, predictions, and simulations-and assertional knowledge-e.g., information about specific entities in the domain of interest. Observations are introduced into the domain of quantification of a distinct first-order theory that describes their nature and their organization and takes track of the way they are experimentally acquired or intentionally elaborated. A model mainly represents the theoretical knowledge or hypotheses on a domain, while the theory of observations mainly represents the empirical knowledge and the given experimental practices. We propose a precise identity criterion for observations and we explore different links between models and observations by assuming a degree of independence between them. By exploiting some techniques developed in the field of social choice theory and judgment aggregation, we sketch some strategies to solve inconsistencies between a given set of observations and the assumed theoretical hypotheses. The solutions of these inconsistencies can impact both the observations-e.g., the theoretical knowledge and the analysis of the way observations are collected or produced may highlight some unreliable sources-and the models-e.g., empirical evidences may invalidate some theoretical law

Design Knowledge Representation: An Ontological Perspective

We present a preliminary high-level formal theory, grounded on knowledge representation techniques and foundational ontologies, for the uniform and integrated representation of the different kinds of (quali- tative and quantitative) knowledge involved in the designing process. We discuss the conceptual nature of engineering design by individuating and analyzing the involved notions. These notions are then formally charac- terized by extending the DOLCE foundational ontology. Our ultimate purpose is twofold: (i) to contribute to foundational issues of design; and (ii) to support the development of advanced modelling systems for (qualitative and quantitative) representation of design knowledge